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There exists an extensive literature about. economies with price rigidities, where some
constraints on the set of admissible price systems are exogenously given. In this paper
two models of a political economic system are described where the price rigidities are
endogenously chosen by political candidates. Sufficient conditions for the existence of a
political economic equilibrium are given for both models. 1~loreover, it is shown that,
generically, political candidates will not choose price regulations leading to a ~K alrasian
equilibrium, but instead will impose price regulations upon the economic system which
exclude all ~~'alrasian equilibria and therefore lead to rationing of consumers.1 Introduction
In Herings (1994) a model of the political economic system has been given such that the
price regulations imposed on the economic system resulted endogenously. ~loreover, in
that paper an example has been given where the price regulations are chosen in such a
way by the political candidates that the Walrasian equilibrium price system is excluded.
Howe~.er, it is not clear whether this is the typical case. !~Ioreover, it is clear that it is
possible to construct examples where both political candidates propose price regulations
such that a ~~'alrasian equilibrium results.
In this paper different assumptions are made with respect to t.he economy, guaran-
teeing that the indirect utility functions of the consumers satisfy certain differentiability
properties. Then it will be possible to answer the question whether. generically, political
candidates choose price regulations excluding a ~~alrasian equilibrium. Moreover, under
these assumptions it is possible to formulate another appealing model of the political eco-
nomic system where political candidates are considered to choose only among local options
given some status quo. i~lore precisely, political candidates have the possibility to choose
directions of motion away from the status quo and the possibility to stay at the status quo.
Acquiring information concerning proposals very far away from the status quo, like voting
behaviour at such a proposal, is often very expensive. ~Ioreover, institutional restrictions
or commitments made in the past may rule out large changes. This provides some mo-
tivation for the restriction to local options. The pay-offs for the political candidates are
determined by the marginal change in the number of votes corresponding to a certain di-
rection of motion. .-~n equilibrium of the resulting game is called a directional political
economic equilibrium. This way of modelling the political s}.stem is inspired by Coughlin
and `itzan (1981).
In Section 2 the assumptions made ~z-ith respect to the political economic system are
described and the model of Herings (1994) is presented. In Section 3 some known results
with respect to the partial derivatives of the indirect utility functions of the consumers
are gi~-en. ~Ioreover, the model of a political economic system where political candidates
choose between local options given some status quo is presented. The status quo will
be assumed to be some ~~'alrasian equilibrium of the economv. It is shown that a direc-
tional political economic equilibrium in pure strategies exists and a characterization of
the equilibrium actions of the political candidates is given. ln Section 4 it is shown that,
generically, both in the model of Herings (1994) and in the model of Section 3, a Walrasian
equilibrium is unstable in a political economic system, unless there is only one consumer in
the economy, or there is only one commoditv. For the model of Herings (1994) it is shown
that, generica]ly, given a proposal of a political candidate corresponding to a Walrasian
equilibrium, there exist price regulations excluding this Walrasian equilibrium and being
Ibetter responses than proposing this ~~'alrasian equilibrium. For the model of Section 3 it
is shown that, generically, both political candidates choose to move away from the status
quo, being any ~~ alrasian equilibrium. In Section 5 the directional political economic equi-
librium is determined for the same example as given in Herings (1994). It will be shown
that in this example the unique Walrasian equilibrium is indeed unstable.
2 The Political Economic System
In the following, for k E N, define Ik - {1,...,k}, Q~ -{q E Rk ~ 0 G q~ G 1, t1j E Ir~},
let Ok be a k-dimensional vector of zeroes, let lk be a k-dimensional vector of ones, let
-xk be a k-dimensional vector with every component equal to -x, and let -}-xk be a k-
dimensional vector with every component equal to -~oo. The set of extended real numbers is
denoted by R' and the k-dimensional Cartesian product of this set by R`k. If .~', ~2 E R-k,
then ~' G x2 means x~ G x~, `dj E Ik, x' C x2 means .~' c xz and there exists j E I~ such
that ~~ G.~~, and x' GG x2 means x~ G x~, b'j E Ik. Similarly, ), ~, and 1~ are defined.
The set {~ E R'k ~ x) Ok} is denoted by Rt and the set {x E R'k ~ x~~ Ok} is denoted
by R~~. The sets Rt and R~~ are defined similarly.
It is assumed in this paper that there are .~1 E N consumers, indexed by i E I;~~,
~~~ E I` `{ 1} commodities, indexed by j E I,v, and two political candidates, indexed by
k E I2. Every consumer i E I,tir is characterized by the consumption set X', the utility
function u' :.?í' -~ 1R. representing the preference relation ~`, and the initial endowment
w`. ~otice that there is no loss of generality in assuming that u`(.~") C(0,1). Together
this constitutes the economy ~ - (X`. ~' ~`)~Et,,,.
The rationing function. specif}-ing the admissible rationing schemes, is given by the
arr (. L ~~-ith 1: ~- -~ -R'~r'~` the rationin function on su l~ and L: ~~ ~ R''r'ti~
P~ ( ) Q' } g PP .' Q' t
the rationing function on demand. The set j-j,Er~, X' is denoted by ,~'. If x-(r'. ... ,.~~~)
is an element of -Y, then x~ -(.~j,... ;x~)T, b'j E I;ti.. ~Ioreoeer, w~ - (w'....,w'tir) and
w~ -(w~ ... , w~~)T . dj E I;~~. For every i E I~~, for e~.ery j E I;~ . component (i - 1).1' f j
of 1 is denoted b~- 1~. `Ioreover. 1' -(l~, ..., l~.)T, b'i E 1,~r, and h-(h, ..., hr)T , Hj E 1,~..
The same notation is used for the function L, for a rationing scheme on supply 1 E -Rt~~"~ ,
and for a rationing scheme on demand L E R~~r'~` .
Given a price system p E R~ and a rationing scheme (1', L' ) E-R}~ x Rt~~ of consumer
i E L~f, the budget set 3'(p, l', L') of consumer i is defined by
~' ( P,1'. L' )-{ x' E X' ~ P~ x' G p- ~.;` and l' C~' -;~;' G L` }
and the set b'(p,1'. L') denotes the set of best elements of ~3`(p,1`, L`) for ~` . The set P of
~price regulations is defined by
P-{(P,P) E Rt x~~ I P C P,P,v - P:v - 1}.
.an element (p. p) E P induces the set of admissible price systems P(P,p), defined by
v
P(P.á)-{PE)Rt IPCP~P}-
So commoditt~ ,` is assumed to be a numeraire commodity tvith price equal to l. Git-en
(,l"'. ~'.;~'),EI„ and (1, L), (p, p) yields the economy
E(P~P) - ((X`, ~`-w`)~EI,u~ P(P~P)~ (l, L)l -
.A Drèze equilibrium is defined as follows.
Definition 2.1 (Drèze Equilibrium)
Let some (p, p) E P be given. A Drèze equilibrium of the economy ï(p, p) -((X', -~'
, w');EIM, P(P,p), (l, L)) is an element
(P`, l`, L', ~') E PIP,á) x l(Qv) x L(Q-~ ) x.1
satisfying
L. for e2~ery consumer i E IM, x" E b' (p', I". L") ,
~ ., , ,ti-
~iEl,y T - ~tEt,tir "' - ~ ,
~. for et~ery commodity j E I,~--1, :r~' - w~ - h` for some consumer i' E Itr implies
.r~` - w~ C L~'. di E Ly, and r~`~ - w~~ - L~`` jor some consumer i' E I,ir implies
,r~` - ~.,~~ 1 lj'. fli E Iai.
!~. for ei~ery commodity j E Iv-i. p~ ~ p implies h' G.r~' - u:~, tíi E 1-y, and p~ G p~
implies L~' ].r~` -..;~, b'i E I,tf.
5. l; G xa - ,.~,~'~, G L ~-, Hi E Iaf .
The set of Drèze equilibria of the economy ~(p, p) is denoted by ED(p, p).
The function p: Q~-1 x P --~ ~t~ and the functions l: Q~ti-' -~ -IR}r'~~ and L:
Q~~-' -. lE2~t'ti are obtained by defining, for every j E IN-i,
p~(4,P,P) - max ~{p ,min({~ (2 - 3qi) ~ P~(39~ - 1)-P~})~) ' d(q,P,P) E Q'~-i x P~
h(q) - Í; (inf({1~~~,(3qT,1)T})), t1q E Q'N-1,
L~ (q) - L~ (inf({1'v,31~" -(3qT,2)T})) , yq E Qn`-1,
3and by defining
P~(q,n,P) - 1, d(4,P,~) E QN-' x P
l.~-(q) -(,ti, ~inf({l~ti (34r 1)r})~ yq E Q.v-t
Lv(q) - L,h~ ~inf({1w,31w -(34r,~)T})1 yq E Q.v-t
For everv consumer i E I,y, the reduced demand relatioln b' : Q'~~-' x P-~ lEi'~- is defined
bv
b'(v~,~) - b`(P(q,~,p),~`(q),L'(q)), d(q.~,n) E Q"~-' x P.
The notational conventions used for l and L are also used for l and L. Let some (p, p) E P
be given. If, for some q' E Q'1-1. there exists ~" E b'(q', p, p), di E hr, such that
~;Et,,, ,r" -~;EI,u w', then, under weak assumptions with respect to consumption sets and
preference relations, (p(q', p, p), l(q'), L(q'), x') E Eo(p. p), called a Drèze equilibrium of
E~(p, p) induced by q'. The set Q~(p, p) is defined by QD(p, p) -{q' E QN-' ~~iEl,,, w` E
~;EIMb`(q',~,p)}. ~loreover, under weak assumptions with respect to the economv, no
Drèze equilibria are lost by restricting attention to the Drèze equilibria induced by some
element of QD(p, p).
Every political candidate k E 12 has a set of admissible price regulations Ak C P,
determining the set of admissible actions Ak, defined by .4k - {(ak.qk) E .9k x Q~N-' ~ qk E
Qo(ak)}. The set of admissible actions corresponding to the set of price regulations P is
denoted b~~ tl. The indirect utility function v'` : A-~ [0, 1] of consumer i E I,ti~ is defined
by associating with everv (a,q) E A the real number v'(a,q) satisfying v''(a~,q) - u`(~")
da~" E~`(q, a). For every i E I,y, for every k E 12i the voting function r'k :(0, 1) x(0,1) --~
[0.1] describes the expectations of a political candidate about the voting behaviour of
consumer i concerning political candidate k, i.e., -'k(v' z~~) is the probability a political
candidate assigns to the event that consumer i E I,~I votes for political candidate k if the
proposal of political candidate 1 vields consumer i a utility level a' and the proposal of
political candidate 2 yields consumer i a utility le~-el t~2. For the sake of simplicity it is
assumed that both political candidates have the same expectations and that there are no
abstentions, so. for every i E I,~~, r'I(i~'(a',qt).i~'(a2,9')) ~ rrsz(L~`(a',9'),L'`(a2,9Z)) - 1.
d((a'~9'),(a~~4~)) E A' x A~.
It is assumed that political candidates maximize their expected plurality in the elections.
Therefore, the pay-off function Ií' : A' x A2 -~ 1R of political candidate 1 is defined by
Ií t ~(a' . ql ), (a2, 42)~
, - ~ T~~ ~L~(at'qt) z'~(a~'q~)~
~E I,y
- ~ r'2 ~i'(al,ql),i''(a2,q2)~, d~(at~4t),(a2,9Z)~ E.41 x ~lZ.
iEltd
~lThe pay-off function lí2: A' x,A2 --~ R of political candidate 2 is easily seen to be
given by lí2--lí1. A political economic equilibrium of the political economic system
~- l~-~`,u`,"1')iELat~(I~L),(Ak,(~tk){ELtir)kEl2) 1S deflned aS fOIIOWS.
Definition 2.2 (Political Economic Equilibrium)
.~ political economic equilibrium of the political economic system i' -((X',u`.w'),Ej,r,
(I,L), (.4k,(F'k);E1~,)i,Et,) is a;~'ash equilibrium of the mixed extension of the game ~-
Í~'.-`1~,~~',1i~)-
For the main results of this paper the following assumptions are made.
A1. For everv consumer i E 1,~~. the consumption set X' is equal to R~~.
A2. For ever~- consumer i E I,~r, the utility function u` : X' --~ (0, 1) is twice continuously
differentiable, u`(X') -(0, 1), has no critical point, and represents the preference
relation ~` being complete, transitive, continuous, strongly monotonic, strongly con-
vex, of the class C2, satisfying the boundary condition, and having non-zero Gaussian
curvature.
A3. For e~~erv consumer i E I,ti1, the initial endowment w` belongs to X'.
A4. The rationing function (l, L) is flexible, market independent, continuously differen-
tiable, monotonic, and. for every j E I,~-, d~~h(q) ~ 0'~r, dq E Q'", and óq~L~(q) ~ 0tir,
dq E Q.a
A5. For everv political candidate k E I2, A~` -{(p, p) E P ~ p- p}.
A6. For e~-er~- consumer i E It~, for every political candidate k E 12, the voting function
n'k :(0.1) x(0,1) ~[0.1] is continuously differentiable.
For some results it is sufficient to take .~ssumption A6. but for other results Assumption
A i is needed.
A7. For everv consurner i E 1~~, the ~-oting function ri1 :(0, 1) x(0. 1) -~ (0, 1] is
twice continuously differentiable, 8„~r,''(i~',i~~) ) 0, d(i',u~) E(0,1) x(0.1), and
óti.~~r'i(i;~,v~) G 0, t1(i~r,u~) E(0,1) x(0.1). For every consumer i E I,~r, the vot.ing
function -`~ :(0. 1) x(0, 1) ~[0. 1] is twice continuously differentiable, 8„~r'~(i~r,u~) G
0, `d(v~,i~~) E(0,1) x(0,1), and t7„~r,`~(i~r.i~~) ) 0, `d(vi,v~) E(0,1) x(0,1).
Notice that, for every consumer i E I~.r, a preference relation ~' satisfying the conditions
given in Assumption A2 can indeed be represented by a twice continuously differentiable
utility function having no critical point. tiloreover, there is no loss of generality involved in
assuming that u'(X') -(0, 1), since due to the .Assumptions A1 and A2, there is no worst
Jand no best element of X` for ~` . Assumption A7 guarantees that voters react in a natural
~ti.a~. to decreases or increases in proposed utility~ levels. `otice that Assumption Aï implies
that, for evert~ z E 1,~[, for every k E Izi 0 G n`k(v', v~) G l, b'(v', v~) E(0, 1) x(0, 1).
Although the assumptions made in Herings (1994) in order to show the existence of
a political economic equilibrium of the political economic system E are not implied by
the Assumptions A1-A6, the proof of the following result is similar as the proof given in
Herings (1994).
Theorem 2.3
L,E~ ijtC pO12Í2CQl ECOri0722tC S1fSfE177. ~- ((i~`,ll`.W`)iElty).(1.L).(Ak.(,~lk)tEly)kEly) Sa.t2Sf7f
the Assurnptions A1-.16. Then there exisis a political eco~tomic equilibrium of the political
economic system E~.
See Herings (199-1), Theorem 4.6, page 21.
3 The Existence of a Directional Political Economic
Equilibrium
First a fe~~- concepts introduced in Laroque (1978) have to be discussed. These concepts
are needed to study some properties of the Drèze equilibria of the economy E(p, p) and of
the indirect utilit~. functions of the consumers at price regulations (p, p) with p - p being
close to p'. where (p', x') with p;~,- - 1 is a ~~'alrasian equilibrium of the economy- ~.
Let (.~í'. u', w');E[-t,. (l. L) satisfy the Assumptions A1-A~l and let a ~Valrasian equi-
librium (p`. x') ~aith p~- - 1 of the econom~~ ~ -((X'. u`.w`),E[ti,) be given, where
((.~~'.u',w'),E[ti,) is assumed to denote the economy ((.X`,-~`,w'),Et,y) with, for every~ i E
I~[, ~' the preference relation being represented by u'. Define the elements q(.z') E Q'~-I
and y(a') E Q'~-1 6~-
v-,
q(x') - inf ( q E Q-
4(x~) - suP ~l9 E
Q,v-t
~(q) G x- - w }) ,
IL(q)?.r--:~}).
For every- commoditv j E 1~-1. define the sets I~(x') and 1~(r`) by~
I~(a') - {i E 1.1-f
1~(x') - {t E Lt~
l,(q(x')) - x~' - w~ } ~
L,(9(~~)) - ~~' -w'~},
so these sets contain the consumers with in some sense minimal and maximal excess demand
on the market of commodity j, respectively. Notice that l,v(q) G~N - w,v C L,v(q),
dq E Q,~-i.
6Let (.fi~`,u',w')iEf~,,(l,L) satisfy the Assumptions A1-A4 and let a Walrasian equi-
librium (p',x') ~t.ith p'~, - 1 of the economy E- ((X',u',u;');E~,N) be given. Let a
sign vector s E~'~-' ~~-ith lo(s) - 0 be given. For every consumer i E I,ti~, for every
(P~,....p~--r)T E R-~-', for every a E R'v-t, define the set Q`''((Pr,...,Prv-i)T,a) bY
i,s T
~ ~(Pl,...,Pti'-1) ,a
T i T i
(P1,...,PN-1, 1) ' ~ - (p1,...epN-t, 1) ' w ,
~~-w~ - l'~(9(x'))~a~ if iEh(~') and jEI-(s),
i1-wj - L~(4(~'))-~a~ if iEh(x') and jElf(s)},
and define the set b' S((pr,...,p:v-i)T,a) by
(5' ~s ~ T `(pl,...,p~--i) {i E;3`'S((Pi,...,p,v-i)T,a) ~




-i i i ~ i,s T l. ~ ~ ~ ,b~.r E~3 ((Pt,....p,v-i) ,a)f
for every a E R'n~-1, define the set r;'((pl,...,p~.-1)T,a)
~' ~(Pi,....p:v-i)T~a)
- Sz E IR~`-r ~z,~' E R, (zT,X:V)T E~,El,y (ó~sÍ(Pl,....p.v-1)T,a) - {uJ'Í)}.
In this ~~-a~-la relation [;s : 1R~-' x R'~-' -~ 1R'V-1 is obtained. In Laroque (19ï8). Propo-
sition 5.1, page 113-1, it is sho~~-n that there exists a set O, being open in IR'ti-1 x R'v-'
and containing ((pi,....p:~.-1)T.O~~-'), such that ~~ó is a continuously differentiable func-
tion. denoted by ~5, so zs : O--~ R1~-'. Therefore, the matrix of partial derivatives,
~rzzs((pi,....p~,-1)T.O~-') is ~~~ell-defined. The follo~~.ing definition is gi~.en in Laroque
(19ï8). Definition 5.1, page 1135.
Definition 3.1 (Regular Walrasian equilibrium)
.4 Gt'alrasian equilibrium (p',r') u~ith p'~. - 1 of the economy E' -((X`,~`.w`),Et,ti,) is
regula~r if for etery sign r~ector s E á~-' u'ith lo(s) -~ the matria of partial deriz~atit~es
aazs((Pi.....p.~~-i)T,O~-') is invertible.
The follo~~~ing result sho~~a the importance of regular ~~'alrasian eyuilibria. `otice that a
~~'alrasian equilibrium (p'.r') ~~.ith p~. - 1 of the econom~~ E' is said to be locally unique
if there exists a set being open in R'~ x lEZ'~r~ and containing (p',~'), but not containing
any other ~~'alrasian equilibrium (p',:r') with p:v - 1 of ~.
Theorem 3.2
Let the ecoaorny E-((X`,u',w'),E~,,,((,L)) satisfy the ,~lssumptions rll-,94, and let
(p',x') urith p;v - 1 6e a locally unique, regular Walrasian equilibrium oJ the econo~ny
~ such that, for eaery j E I,v-1, ~I~(.r') -~h(.z') - 1. Then for every (p, p) E P thereesists q(p) E Qo(p.p) such that, for every i E I,~y, the funcfion v` :]Rt-i -; (0, 1), defined
6y associatíng u~ith every (p~,...,p,~~-1)T E R~-1 the element
z'~(Pi,...,p~~-i) - 2'' ~(Pi,...,P.v-i, 1)T,(Pt,...,Pa--i, 1)T,4((Pi,...,p,v-i, 1)T)~ ,
satisfies that i~'(pi,....p.~,-i)
iEl.~~,
- u'(.x") and áv'(p~,...,p;ti.-1) ezists. :1loreover, for every
dn,z~t(Pi....,P.v-i) - - 8r,vu'(.r")(~~' -w'~), b'j E IN-1.
See Laroque ( 19ïa), Proposition 7.1, page 114~.
1t follows from the results shown bv Laroque that for everv price system p E P being close
to p', there exists a uniquely determined Drèze equilibrium of the economy E'(p.p) being
close to (p', ~`).
The following three results show that the conditions given in Theorem 3.2 are satisfied
for a typica] economy. The set of all utility functions of a consumer i E IM satisfying
Assumption A2 is denoted b}~ U`. This set is given the topology induced by the Cz-topology.
Define the set U by U - j-j,E1M L" and give this set the product topology. Notice that, for
every u E C'. u -(ui, ..., uM) with u' denoting the utility function of consumer i E I,~y.
The set of initial endo~~~ments satisf}'ing Assumption A3 is denoted by 1-2. The follo~ti-ing
result sho~ti-s that, generically, an economy is regular.
Theorem 3.3
Let (.l''),E~~, satisfy the ,-lssumption .-f1. Then there exists an open and dense set U1 in
L` x S2 such that, for e2~ery (u,;~) E U'. every l~i~'alrasian eguilibrium (p',a') u~ith p~- - 1
of fhe economy ~- ((.~`. z~',w')tEl„) is regular.
See ~~~~iesmeth (1979), Theorem, page 25.
The follo~~.ing result shows that a typical economy has a finite number of ~4'alrasian equi-
libria (p'.a') ~~~ith p:~- - 1, so everv ~t'alrasian equilibrium of a typical economy is locallv
unique. The finiteness of the number of ~Valrasian equilibria of a typical economy ~~-as first
sho~~-n in Debreu (1970). Debreu (19 i0) gives a result ~aith the demand functions of the
consumers as primitive concepts. The assumptions made by Debreu are implied by the
assumptions made in Theorem 3.~.
Theorem 3.4
Let (X`, u`),EI,,, satisfy the Assumptions AI-A2. Then there erists a set S?' open in S2 such
that f2 `S2' has Lebesyue measure zero and, for every w E 521, the number of [~t'alrasian
equilibria (p',a~') u~ith p`. - 1 of the economyE - ((.~i',u`,w'),E~,,,) is finite. a~foreover, for
every w~ E f2~, there exists a set O óeing open in S2 and containing w, and there exist con-
tinuous functions fk : O--~ Rt't x X, Hk E IktW~, for some k(w) E 1ti', such that, for every
~w E O, ft(w) , fk~~~(w) are all the different 6i'alrasian equilibria (p(;.~,k),~
u~ith p(,n;. k),v - 1, ~1k E Ik~;,~, of the economy á; -((X',u`,w'),E~M).
See Debreu ( 19i0), Theorem, page 388, and Remark, page 390.
The following extension of Theorem 3.4 is due to Smale (1974).
`a, k))kElk(~
Theorem 3.5
Let (X`);E~,, satisfy Assumption A1. Then there e.rists an open and dense set U2 in
L.' x S2 such that, for every (u,w~) E U2, the number of óvalrasian equilibria (p',,x') with
p'ti, - 1 of the economy lï -((X`,u',w`);El,,,) is finite. Moreover, for every (u,w) E Ll~,
there exists a set C) being open in U x S2 und containing (u,w), and there exist contin-
uous functions fk : U-~ )Rtt x.~C, t1k E Ik~,;,Wl, for some k(u,w) E IV, such that,
for ei~ery (u,w) E C~, f~(u,W),...,fk~u'`~l(u w) are all the different I~'alrasian equilib-
ria (P(u.~,k),.r(u,;~;,k))kElk~~-~ u;ith p(u,w,k),v - 1, dk E Iklu,Wl, of the economy ~-
((X~, u~, wt)~EI.u )'
See Smale (1974), Theorem 1, page 3, and Proposition 4, page 7.
The following theorem states that in every ~~'alrasian equilibrium of a typical economy it
holds that on even~ market there is exactly one consumer having the minimal and exactly
one consumer ha~-ing the maximal excess demand in the sense as mentioned previously. A
similar result is shown in Laroque (1978) for the uniform rationing system.
Theorem 3.6
Let (X`, u`),E~tir. (l, L) satisfy the Assumptions AI-A2 and A~. Then there exists a subset
S2z of f? such that S2 `S22 has Lebesgue measure zero and, for ez.ery w E 52Z. for erery
[i~alrasian eguilibrium (p',~') u~ith p~. - 1 of the economy E' - ((X', u'.,.:'),E~,y), for erery
~ E Iv-i, ~1~(~~) - ~1~(~~) - 1.
Proof
If .17 - I, then the proof is tri~.ial, so assume .~I 1 2 for the remainder of the proof. It
is easily seen that .~ssumption .~4 guarantees that, for every w E S2, for every ~V'alrasian
equilibrium (p',~') ~cith p:~- - 1 of the economy ~- ((X',~',~'),E~y), ~Ii(x') ? 1,
dj E I;~.-1. and ~Í1(.r') ~ 1. b'j E I,~.-~. :~loreover, it follows easily that every ~~-alrasian
eyuilibrium price sy.stem is strictly positive. Let some j' E I,v-1i ~:: E f2, and (p'.:r) E
1R~;. x.~ ~ti~ith p`. - 1 be gi~-en. If (p',:r) is a~~-alrasian equilibrium of the economy
~-((.3{',u`,..~ ),Et,~) and ~IJ~(~) 1 1. then there exists ii,i~ E I,y with ii ~ i~, ~' E)R.
tli E I,ti~, and q~. E[0. 1] such that
i-~ T i i i )T aS.~ (.~ ) - á (P~,...,P.v-~,1 -
, , ~; , , )~,
(Pi,....p,v-i, 1)~ - (Pi,...,P,v-i, 1 ~ -
~~EIM~~ - ~sE~ntwl -
i~, - ~.-` J~, - h~(q) -
0'v, b'i E I,N,
0, tíí E I,tif ,
0, b'j E I,v-i,
0, tli E {il,i2},
9~ti.ith ql.. .., q~,-~. q~~tl, .... q~- arbitraril}~ given elements of [0. 1]. Notice that in (3) the
condition that on the market of the numeraire commodity the total excess demand is equal
to zero is not specified. This condition is implied by the equations in (2) and (3).
Since the function 1 is assumed to be continuously differentiable and óq ,h-(q) ~ 0`u, ~ E
Q~~, there exists a continuously differentiable extension of l, also denoted by l, satisfying
á9 ,h-(q) ~ 0'tit ~~'hen q~~ E (-~, 1-~ E) and q~ E[0, 1], Hj E I,v `{j'}. The function
z, :.~' x Il3.ti~ x Rt~r x S2 x(-e, l~ ~) -. gZ,~rvtnaf:vti
is defined such that, for every (x, ~, (pi ..... p,v-i )T, ~, 9~' ) E .X x R'~ x 1Rt}' x S2 x(-e, 1 f~),
í'(~-~-(Pi,~.~,P.~'-i)~~~~4~') is given by the left-hand side of (1)-(4). For every w E S2, the
function
zJW :.~ x 1R`~ x 1Rt}' x(-~, 1~~) -~ gf,~~.vf,tirt,vfi
is defined by associating with every (x, ~, (pi,..., p.v-i )T, 9i' ) E~ x ff2 ~ x IlZ.tt 1 x(-e, 1-}-e)
~ T ` .T. ~. ( T, uJ ) the element ~r'~(~, ~, (Pi,..., p.v-i) , 9~') - k( Pi...., p:v-i ) , 9~'
Let ~-(i, ~, (Pi,..., P;v-i)~, ~, 9~~) E-~ x 1R,tif x TR.~~' x S2 x(-E,1 -~ e) be such that
~,(~) - O.N'vf.tiJ}N}' The matrix of partial derivatives of ~ evaluated at 1' is denoted by !~I
and gi~-en in Table 3.1. Again, ql, ..., q~,-1, 4~~f1, ..., qn~ are arbitrarily chosen elements of
[0, 1]. It will be sho~~-n that the matrix ~l1 has rank -ti1V~:~1-~.V f 1. Let y E~'~v}'~t'~-fi
be such that yT.11 - 0~'~'vt~tt'v~. Then, y~aW~,~:~(~) - 0, di E I,y, implies
yni.vt, - 0, Hi E I,t~.
`Ioreo~~er. (5) and yTa~,~ti~(~) - 0. flj E I,-1 ` {j'}, implies
,
y.~r:vfa~t~ - 0. dj E Iv-~ `{j'}.
From (5) and (6) it follows that
y~~a,-~'(~)
(6)
-y.~~.vt.tiff~' - y:tif~-t.tift.~. - 0. ( ~)
-y.tf;vt:tiff~' - y.tit.~t.tft~-ti - 0, (8)
-ysr.ti-t.titt~' - 0, b'i E Ltif ` {il,iz}. (9)
-óq ,l;-(4)y.tit.vttiit,~~ - ~7q ,~~~(9)ytifvt~tt.vfi - 0. (10)
If .~1 ) 3, then (9) implies y,N;vtalf~~ - 0, so then it follows from (7) and (8) that
,y.tii.vfs~t,v - y,~,v~ntfvti - 0. If :~11 - 2, then (7) and (8) implies y,y,vtnrtn' - y,tir,vt,tiftNtl -
-ytit,~~t,vt}~~. Then it follows from (10) that
(aa,, l;' (4) ~ aa,~ h~ (9))y.~f.vfnlt~' - ~,
10-Pi - 111'ti~-1
:~s~ul~il) ) P.v-t r pN-t
-1
0 0




i .~r r .x
:
i P `'-j O v-i T
- 1
~P~~JEIn~-~1 ~xj~~)JEIn~-~ ~-Pf)]ELv-i -1
0 0
. OMxM : p~4f
~ 0
~Pj)lEl.v-~1 rN~lf)lEltv-~ - Pj)jElx-~ -1
LN-1 ~1'-1 LY-1 Q.N-i ~iN-1)x.N O(N-t)x(N-1) -iN'-1 QN-1 -I,V-I ~.v-1 O,Y-1
eMN((il - 1):~, t j~)T OMT ~.v-lT -eM,v~~it - 1)N ~-J~)T aa,-ij~~9)
e.tf.~~~i' - 1).~" f j~)T ~.tfT ~.v-tr -E.afN(~i' - 1).b' f I~)T aa,~h?~9)
.1f ;V -1
Table 3.1. The matrix .~f.
1
so y.~~~-~.~t~J~ - 0 since c7q ,1~,(q) ~ (0, 0) by' Assumption .-~~. Therefore.
J.tf.~-t:~1ti' - 0, J.tif.~t.tif.v - 0, and y.t~`'taft,~-fi - 0. (11)
L'sing the non-zero Gaussian curvature of ~`, tfi E I,~l, it follo~~'s that
C ~
a~ ui(~) a u~(~`)~
~~
det r'r' r~ ~ 0. ~di E I.1f.
cis, u' (.i ) 0
So the first ~~ rows of this matrix are independent. Since ~7r,u`(.r ) -~'(p~.....p'~--1,1).
`di E Ltr, it follo~ti's that the a- ro~cs of the matrix
l ~Z's`u31~ ) (-
Pli...,-~7~~.-t.-1)T ~
are independent. Since. by (5), (6). and (11),
T
y~á~,v(~) - ~ az~tG~~t-t),vfj(~)y(,-t):vt~ - 0~~ ,
JEI.v
fl
tli E Iti~,it follows that, for every i E Iat,
y(~-~~,vt, - 0, b'j E I,v.
Therefore. ~- 011'~~t'tirt 1~}I so :11 has rank :M11:~`~.11f-~'f 1, and i;~ intersects {0-u.vfaat.vti }
transversally-. ~; r~i {0'~~'1}'tt}'1~t'}. Let the set f2~~ be defined by
52~, - {;.; E S2 ( ~;~ r-fi {pti~lt.aft.vt~}}.
Since X x R'~t x Rt}' x S2 x(-e, I~-e) is an (2!fI.1' f a1-~ :~r)-dimensional C~ manifold,
R~t1~1~}'~t t'1~t' is an (.Lla' f,L'1 f:V f 1)-dimensional C~ manifold, 0`N'v}`tir}`1~}' is a 0-
dimensional C~ manifold, and zL~ E C'(X x R't~ x lR~~' x S2 x(-E, 1-~ s), g~.til~vf,~trvti),
it follows from the transversalit}~ theorem, see for instance Theorem L2.2 of ~Ias-Colell
(19b~), that the set S2 `f2~~ has Lebesgue measure zero. For every~ w E 52~~, zJ" is a function
from an (.19:V -~ .11-~ .1' )-dimensional C~ manifold into an (;LIN~.til f a' f 1)-dimensional
C~ manifold, {0'~'1~}-~1t'1~}' } is a 0-dimensional C~ manifold, ~" E Ct(X x R'ti~ x Rt'~' x
(-~, 1 f ~), R,tit,vt.~f,vtl ), and y~íW rTi {O.t~.vtn-ft.vtl } so ~~-~ ({O.artvt.vfn~ti }) -(~. Hence,
the set of initial endowments w of S2 such that there exists a ~Valrasian equilibrium (p`, ~')
with p~. - 1 and ~h~(r') ] 1 of the economy E- ((X`, u`,w`)iEl„) has Lebesgue measure
zero. Similarlv, it can be shown the set of initial endowments w of f2 such that there
exists a l~~alrasian equilibrium (p',.r') with p;1, - 1 and ~h~(x') 1 1 of the economy
E' -((.k-`. u'. w`),E~~, ) has Lebesgue measure zero. 5ince a finite union of sets with Lebesgue
measure zero has Lebesgue measure zero, it follo~~-s that, for e~-er~~ ~~~alrasian equilibrium
(p'.:r") ~~-ith p:1. - 1 of the economy- t' -((.ti'.u`.w`),E~.tr), for e~~ery j E 1,1, ~1~(.r') -
~Í,(a') - 1, except for a set of initial endo~~~ments w of S2 ha~.ing Lebesgue measure zero.
Q.E.D.
The results of Theorem 3.3. Theorem 3.5, and Theorem 3.6 ~-ield the following theorem.
Theorem 3.7
Let (X`),E1,,. (l, L) satisfy the Assumptions .11 and .-14. Then there exists an open and
dense set U3 in C x S2 such that, for erery ( u.w) E U~3, eaery l~'alrasian eqtrilíbr~iurn
(p`,.r') u;~ith p:1- - 1 of the econonzy tï -((.X`,u`,..;`),Eiti,) is locally unique and regu-
lar, u~hile, for ei~erq j E 1,1.. ~1~(~`) -~1~(r') - 1. .Lloreoz~er, for et.ery ( u,,:;) E Lt``~,
there exists a set C) being open in L- x SZ and contatning (u,w), and there erist contin-
uous functions fk :(~ -~ 1R~t x.X, dk E Ik~,;,;~~, for some k(u,w) E Iv, such that,
for every (u,w) E C). fl(u,w),..., fk~u~W~(u,w) are all the different I~t'alrasian equilib-
ria (p(u.w.k),,r(u.w.k))kE~k~~~~ with p(u,;.,~.k),1. - 1. dk E Ik~u,w~, of the econorny ~-
((X`.11`.s:~)iEl:~r).
Proof
12Let U' and UZ denote the sets given in Theorem 3.3 and Theorem 3.5, respectively. Clearly,
the set U' nU2 is open and dense in G~ x f2 being an intersection of two open and dense sets.
Let U3 be the set of utility functions and initial endowments (u, w) of Z.f' n Ll2 such that,
for everv 4~'alrasian equilibrium (p`, ~') with p;v - 1 of the economy ~- ((X' ut w');E1ti, )
for every j E I~--1, ~1,(~') -~h(~`) - 1. It will be shown that U3 is open and dense
in G- x S2. ~otice that this is trivial if M- 1, so assume .1~1 ~ 2 for the remainder of the
proof.
For every- u E C, let S2„ denote the set of initial endowments such that, for every ~~'alrasian
equilibrium (p',.r') with p`, - 1 of theeconomy E-((X',u',w');E~.M), for every j E I,~--1,
~I,(:r') -~I,(r`) - 1. Obviously. by Theorem 3.6, the set {(u,w) E G' x S2 ~ w E S?„}
is dense in (.' x S2. ~ow U' n U2 n{(u,w) E G' x D ~ w E f2„} is dense in U x S2 as
an intersection of an open and dense sets in U x f~ and a dense set in L x R. Since
U' n U2 n{( u, w) E(.~ x~ ~ w E ~2„ }- U3, it follows that U3 is dense in li x 52.
Let some (u,u;) E U3 be given and let fk : U -~ ~i}t x X, t1k E Ik~,;,Wi, be the contin-
uous functions given in Theorem 3.5. For every j E I,v-r, for every k E Ikiu,W~, denote
the elements q(~(u,~;, k)) and q(x(u,;a, k)), and the sets 1~(x(u,~, k)) and h(x(u,;:~, k)),
corresponding to the ~~'alrasian equilibrium fk(u,w) - (p(u,w, k), ~(u,w, k)), by qk qk, h
and 1~, respectively. Let the function fo : C~ -~ S2 be defined by fo(u,w) - w, b'(u,w) E C~.
Clearly. fo is continuous. For every k E Ik~u,y~, for every j E 1,4.-1, let the function
g~ : 1Rt} x X x S2 -~ IR be defined by associating with every (p,.r,w) E 1R~} x X x!2 the
element
k i i -!t k
9, (P.,r.w) - min ( ,r~-w~ ,(9 ) i E Ltir ~ 1;} U{L;(4k)-~~~wJ
Clearl~-. g~ is continuous. Let the function h:(.~ -~ 1R be defined by
h(u,..;) - min ({gk(fk(u,w), fa(u.;.~))
i E I,tif `1~}~ -
j E I,ti.-t, k E Ik~;..~)~) , ~l(u,w) E C7.
Clearly. h is continuous. `otice that h(u,:~) ) 0. Since (l, L) is monotonic and continuous,
there exists ~ E]R~t such that, for every (u.~.:) E C) with ~h(u,w) - h(u,,.:)~ C::, for every
~~-alrasian equilibrium (p',r`) with p~,. - 1 of the economy ~-((.k~', u`,w');Er,u). for every
j E I,~-,, ~`1,(.r') -~I,(a`) - l. The set h-'((h(u,w) -::, h(u,,:;) -}- ~)) is open in U by
the continuitv of h, hence also open in C- x S2, and contains (u.,::). Therefore, U3 is open
in C" x r?. Q.E.D.
For the remainder of this section, let (X', u',w');E~M, (l, L), ((~r`k);E~.,,)kE1z be given such
that the :~ssumptions A1-~4 and A6 are satisfied and (u,w) is an element of the set U3
given in Theorem 3.ï.
Let a ~~-alrasian equilibrium (p',z~') with p;v - 1 of the economy E~ - ((X',u',w'),E1,t)
be given. From Theorem 3.ï it follows that (p', x') is a locally unique and regular ~1'al-
rasian equi]ibrium of the economy E, while, for every j E I,~~-r, 1~(~') - h(~`) - 1. From
13the remark below Theorem 3.2 it follows that, for every price system p E P being close to
p', there exists a uniquely determined Drèze equilibrium of the economy ~(p, p) being close
to (p',.~'). This suggests a very appealing alternative model for the competition of votes
between political candidates. Consider the ~~alrasian equilibrium (p',~') with p,`ti: - 1
of the economy~ ~ as the status quo of the economy. The political candidates can either
choose a direction of change with respect to the status quo, or choose to stay at the status
quo. If a political candidate chooses a specific direction of change, then it is assumed that
the uniquely determined Drèze equilibrium specified in Theorem 3.2 being close to the
~~'alrasian equilibrium results. So, political candidates are no longer assumed to choose a
specific Drèze equilibrium, but are restricted to choose between local options. Aloreover,
from Theorem 3.2 it follo~-s that the change in utility of the consumers is uniquely deter-
mined if a political candidate chooses a specific direction of change. It is again assumed
that political candidates maximize their expected plurality in the elections, or, more pre-
cisely, political candidates choose a direction of change affecting their marginal expected
plurality optimally. ~otice that this ~-ay of modelling the political system captures some
interesting real world phenomena. First of all, the cost of acquiring information for politi-
cal candidates is usually very high for actions far removed from the status quo. Vloreover,
institutional reasons and commitments made in the past often require political candidates
to stay near the status quo. Finally, political candidates need onh. bother about the price
regulations to implement, they no longer need to specify the resulting Drèze equilibrium if
there is more than one.
Let a ~~'alrasian equilibrium (p"..r') with p~- - 1 of the economy E be the status quo.
The set of admissible actions .4k of a political political candidate k E Iz is given by a
subset of the set A. defined by
A- {p E 1R~-'~ ~~P~~z - 1} U{0~-'~.
The action `` E,,4k of a olitical candidate k E Iz corres onds to a chan e of ' T P P P g (P~,....P~--i)
in the direction p`k. If p'k - 0~-', then political candidate ~~ E Iz chooses to sta~~ at the
status quo (p`,.r'). For the main results, the following very ~~-eak assumption is made.
A8. For everv political candidate k E Iz. the set of admissible actions A~ is non-empty..
closed. and .d~ C .4.
The pay-off function Ií' : A' x Az -~ )R of political candidate 1 is defined by associating
with e~rery (p'. p) E A' x Az the element
Iíi(P~,Pz)
~i -~ . . .., . .. . .
- ~ Ci„~r, w (Pi....,P,~--i),z (Pi,...,P.v-i) a(a~....,p:.--,)Tv'(Pi,...,P.v-i)Pl
~Elsr
14i2 ,~i ,. ~ . . -~i r . 1
- ~ á,.,r. ~v (Pi,...,P.v-i),v'(Pi,...,P,v-i) a(n,,....nN-,)~z' (Pi....,p,v-i)P
,E~.u
il (-~: . . ~i , -~- r r
f ~ 8„zn v (Pi,...,p.~-i),v (Pi,...,p:ti--i) a(n,,....n.v-,)Tvl(Pl,...,p,v-i)P2
,El,u
.. . .. ( , „ . r
- ~ ÓL.~T'~ ~U' (Pi....,P.v-1)~U~1P1....,P;~i-1) a(n,,....n:v-,)TZ~(P1,...,P,Y-1)P2.
iE(;u
The pay-off function lí2: A' x A2 -~ ]fi of political candidate 2 is easily seen to be given
b~~ Íí 2 - - Íí ' .
Definition 3.8 (Directional Political Economic Equilibrium)
A directional political economic equilibrium of the political economic system E-((X`,
u',w')iE~,,,, (l,L), (Ak.(r'k),E~,r)kEt,) u'ith status quo the localfy unique, regular óValrasian
equilibrium (p'..r`) with p;~, - 1 and 11(x') - I~(~') - 1, `dj E I,v-i, of the econ-
omy ~- (.~',u',w')iE~„), is a.~~ash equilibrium of the miaed eatensiorz of the game
9 - (-4~, A~, lí' ,1i ~).
Let a Walrasian equilibrium (p',.r') with p`ti, - 1 of the economy ~ be the status quo. For
e~ery k E 12i let k' E IZ be such that k' ~ k, and define the function Iík} : Ak -~ ffi by
associating ~~~ith every pk E Ak
4 , . ~ . . , ..; . . --k
Iík}(pk) - ~ ti~,kr.'k ~ï`(Pi....,P.v-t),z'~(Pi.....P.~-i)~ ~(n,,...,nx-,)Tv (Pi.....P.~-i)P
~E l,y
„ . .. . .
-~ ó,..r;k' (i~'(Pi,....p.v-i),z't(Pi,....p.v-i) a(n,,...,n:v-,)TUi(Pi,...,P~~-i)P -
,ELof
`o~ti. the follo~~-ing theorem can be shown.
Theorem 3.9
LEt thE pol2t2Cal ECOnOm2C syste7n ~- ((X'.2l'.r~:`),El.u,(l.l.),(Ak.(Tik)sEl,u)kEh) u'tth Sta-
tus quo (p',a') satisfy the Assumptions A1-Al~, A6, and .-18, u;here (u,w) is an element of
the set Lf3 given in Theorem 3.7 and (p',.r') u'ith p,'ti. - 1 is a Gt'alrasian equilibrium of the
economy E-((X',u`,w~')iE~.N). Then there erists a directional political economic equilib-
riuTn in pure strategies of the political economic system E u~ith status quo (p', ~`). ~lloreover,
(p'. p~) E A' x A~ is a directional political economic eguilibrium in pure strategies of the






p2 E A2 }~ .
Proof
For every k E 12. the set Ak is compact and the function lí k} is continuous, so there exists
pk E Ak such that




lí't(p'') - lï2t(p2) ~ Ií'}(pr) - líz}(Pz)
!í'(p',p 2), bp`' E A',
Íí2}(p 2) - Ií'}(p') ? lí~}(p`2) - Íí'}(P')
- ~t2(P 1,P2)~ bp'2 E ,.42.
So, (p~',p`2) is a directional political economic equilibrium in pure strategies of the political
economic system ~ with status quo (p', x`).
Let (p'''. p''z) E A1 x A2 be any. political economic equilibrium in pure strategies of the
economy E with status quo (p', x'). Then,
Íí'(Pi,P~) - lí't(p') - lí~}(p ~) ? Íí'(P'.P~)
- lí't(p') - lí~}(p ~), bPi E Ai,
lï~(P',P'~) - IC~}(p ~) - lï't(p') ~ lí~(Pi,P~)
Iï~}(p~) - lí'}(P i), bP~ E A~.
50, lí'}(p''') - max({lí't(p`') ~ p' E A'}) and lí~}(p'~) - max({Ií~}(p ) ~~ E A~}).
Q.E.D.
4 Generically Chosen Price Regulations
The existence of a political economic equilibrium of the political economic sy.stem E' has
been sho~~~n in Herings (1994). In the example of Herings (199~I) price regulations incompat-
ible with the `~'alrasian equilibrium price system ~ti.ere chosen by the political candidates
in the politica] economic equilibrium. The existence of a directional political economic
equilibrium of the political economic s~~stem E with status quo a~~'alrasian equilibrium
has been shown in Section 3. In the example of Section 5 the political candidates will
choose directions of movement a~i~ay from the ~i'alrasian equilibrium price s}~stem in the
directional political economic equilibrium. ~evertheless, it is not clear whether this is the
t~-pical case. To answer this question, the following assumption ~~~ith respect to the model
of Section 3 will be made in the main results of this section.
A9. For every political candidate k E I2, .4k - Á.
~laking Assumption A9 and using Theorem 3.9 it is possible to show the even stronger
result of Theorem ~.1, where the directional political economic equilibria in pure strategies
of ~~~'ith status quo (p",x') are characterized.
Let (.~C',u',w');E~M,(l,L),((a'k);ELu)kE1y be given such that the Assumptions A1-A4
and A6 are satisfied and (u,w) is an element of the set U3 given in Theorem 3.ï. Moreover,
16let a ~~-alrasian equilibrium ( p',.v') with p~, - 1 of the economy ~-((X',u`,,a')iElti,) be
given. For ever~. k E I2, let k' E IZ be such that k' ~ k, and define the vector lík E~'~-'
bv
iík
ik -,i . ..- . ..- . . ~ á~.k~ w (Pl,....p,~'-1),v`(P1,...,P:V-1)~ a(Pt...., P,v-1)T~~(P1,...,P1~~-1)
~ E I.L~
T
ik~ (~i . ~- . ~~ . .
- ~ ~z.kr, v(Pi....,P,v-t),v'(Pi,...,P,~--i)~a(a~,....a.v-,)Tv'(Pi,....p,ti~-t) -
iE l,~y
Theorem 4.1
LEt the paltt2Cal ECD?lOm2C systEm ~- (('~',u',~')iEh,t,(l.l).(Ak (~ik)iE1y)kElz) ~'ith Sta-
tus quo (p',r") satisfy the ,4ssumptions AI-A4, A6, and .19, u~helre (u,w) is an element
of the set Lf3 given in Theorem 3.7 and (p',~') with pa. - 1 is a ófr'alrasian equilibrium of
the economy E' -((X', u',w'),El,u). Let (pt, p 2) be a directional political economic equilib-
rium of the political economic system E u~ith status quo (p',.~'). For every k E I2, either
Itik- D,v-i, or Íí k~ ON-t and p.k - Iík~~~j~ k~~2-
Proof







For e~~er~- k E I2. since lík}(pk) -!í k. p`k dp'k E Ák, and since .Ak is the union of the unit
sphere B~~-2(0~-'.1) and {0~~-1}, the theorem follows immediatel~~. Q.E.D.
If in Theorem -1.1 it holds that Íík - 0~'-' for a political candidate k E I2. then, gi~~en
the action chosen b~- his opponent. every admissible action ~~ields political candidate k the
same pa~--off. If both lí t~ 0~-1 and Íí2 ~ 0,~-'. then the directional political economic
equilibrium is unique.
It could be the case that in a t~~pical political economic equilibrium both politica] can-
didates propose a price regulation corresponding to the same ~~'alrasian equilibrium or that
in a t~~pical directional political economic equilibrium both political candidates choose to
sta~- at the ~~'alrasian equilibrium. being the status quo. It is clear that it is alwa}.s possible
to construct examples where this happens. :~ioreover, since it is well-known that Drèze
equilibria not corresponding to a~~~alrasían equilibrium are usually not Pareto efficient,
it would not be completely~ surprising if this would turn out to be the case generically, or
at least for a non-degenerate class of economies. `evertheless, in this section it is sho~~-n
that the situation in the example of Herings (1994) and in the example to be presented
in Section 5 are typical cases. ~~loreover, it is shown that if the opponent of a political
17candidate chooses an action corresponding to a ~~'alrasian equilibrium, then the generic
case is that the action of the political candidate leading to the same Walrasian equilibrium
can be improved upon by playing an action not corresponding to a Walrasian equilibrium.
Similarly, it is shown that, generically, political candidates propose directions of movement
awa}~ from the status quo.
Consider the political economic system E'. Suppose political candidate 2 chooses an
action (p',p',q') E ~l2 corresponding to a ~~'alrasian equilibrium of the economy E'. Then
it ~~-ill be sho~an that only in degenerate cases the best response of political candidate 1
is also to choose the action (p'. p', q'). ~'fore precisely, it will be shown that, generically.
for e~-ery open set O in 1R~ti containing (pi,...,p'N-i)T, there is an action (pi,p~,qi) E Ai
~cith (pi,....p~~-i)T E O such that (pi.p~,qi) is a better response against (p`,p',q') than
the action ( p'. p', q') itself, p' not being a ~~'alrasian equilibrium price system. This means
that, generically, proposing price regulations which exclude the Walrasian equilibrium price
system is a better response against a certain Walrasian equilibrium than proposing this
~~-alrasian equilibrium.
Consider the political economic system E with status quo a Walrasian equilibrium
(p',~') of the economy E with p;ti. - L Suppose political candidate 2 chooses the action
0'~~-i E A~. i.e., political candidate 2 proposes to stay at the status quo. Then it will
be sho~t.n that only in degenerate cases the best response of political candidate 1 is also
choosing action 0'1~-1. Even stronger, it will be shown that, generically, lí' ~ 0'~--1. L'sing
svmmetr~~ considerations it follows that, generically, Íí2~ 0~~.-1. So from Theorem -1.1
it follows that in a directional political economic equilibrium, generically. both political
candidates choose to move away from the status quo.
.-~ssumptions ~~~hich have to be made are that there is at least one non-numeraire com-
modity. as is al~~.ays assumed in this paper, and that there are at least two consumers.
Other~ti-ise. every consumer ~~-ill keep his initial endo~i-ments in ever~- ~~'alrasian or Drèze
equilibrium. Hence, it is impossible to influence the voting decision of consumers by propos-
ing price regulations. The set of all possible voting functions of a consumer i E Itit for
political candidate 1 satisfying :~ssumption .~ï is denoted by II`. Hence,
11~ -{ T`~ E c2((o, l) x(o, l), (o. l))I a~.~~~'(z', v~) ~ o. e(v~, v~) E(o, l) x(o, l)
~~zr`i(ui é;~) C 0, t1(i~~.i~~) E(0.1) x(0.1)} .
This set is given the topology induced by the C'-topology. Notice that II`, di E 1,~~, is open
in CZ((0.1) x(0,1),ff~). Define the set II by II - j-j;Et,N II' and give this set the product
topology. `otice that, for every n E Il, a-(a11, ... r.~l) with ~ri1 denoting the voting
function of consumer i E I:y. For some consumer i E I,~y, let n'1 E II' be given and let
18e E Co((0.1) x(0. 1), Rt~) be given. Define the set V~.~,~ by
L;.,~.~ -{ f E C2((0, 1) x(0,1), (0, 1)) ~
~r,tl(i,~,v2)-f(i~l,i~2)~ G e(v',v2), tl(v',v2) E(0,1) x(0,1),
~Ói~i 1fi1(2I1, ~l~) - Óv~J (~~, v~)~ G E(U~, v~), d(Z~, v~) E(~, 1) x(~e 1),
~ati,~n~'(z.',v~)-av~f(v',v~)I G E(v'.z~~), d(v',v~) E(o,l) x(o,l)}.
`otice that V,,.f is a member of the base for the CI-topology~ on C2((0, 1) x(0, 1), (0, 1)).
Let the political economic system ~ be given. Let (p',x') with p:v - 1 and ~1~(x`) -
~1~(,r') - 1, t1j E I~--1, be a locally unique, regular ~~alrasian equilibrium of the econ-
omv ~-((X`. u',w');E~.,,). Let q' E Q'ti-1 be such that the proposal (p', p',q') corre-
sponds to this ~~'alrasian equilibrium. Suppose political candidate 2 proposes (p`,p',q').
Then it holds that (p', p', q') is a best response for political candidate 1 if and only if
lí'((p',p',9~)~(P~,P~,9")) - max~a~,q~~EA~ Ii'((ai,4i),(P~,P,q~)). From Theorem 3.2 it
follows that a necessary condition for (p', p', q') to be a best response of political candi-
date 1 is given by
., . ,. ~ . .
~ ~ÓiiT'' ~2'`(P1,...,P.N-1),Z~(p1,...,PN-1) ~~Pi~...,PN-i)T~~(P]i...,PN-1)
~E~at
i2 (-i . ~ . 1 ~ . . )1- T. ( ~) -ó,,,r t~ (P1....,P.v-i),2'(Pi,...,P:v-i)J a(Pi.....F.v-i)Tul(p7,....p:V-1 l ~.~'-~ l~
From Theorem ~1.1 and the remark made below it, it follo~es that (12) is a necessary~ and
sufficient condition for 0'~`-' to be a possible action of political candidate 1 in a directional
political economic equilibrium of the political economic sy~stem ~ with status quo (p`,x").
L sing that -'' (v', r~) ~- r, `~(z'', u~) - 1. d(v', z~) E(0, 1) x(0. 1) and using Theorem 3.2, it
follows that (12) is equivalent to
-~ C~i.17f'' ~2~`(T's), il'(.E")~ ~rNU~(x~~)(x~` - i,~)j) - ~.d~ E 1~'-7. (13)
~ E I,t~
~otice that the expression in (13) does not depend on n'~, f1i E Ltt. For the remainder of
this section. the ~-oting function r,`', `di E I,y, will therefore be denoted by. r'.
Let (.X',u');E~1, satisfy- the .~ssumptions ~1-.~2. Let the set 12i be as in Theorem
3.1. For every. w E S2'. let k(w) be the number of ~L'alrasian equilibria in the economy
E-((,k'.u'.w'),E~,r). By. Theorem 3.4, for every w E S2'. there exists an open set O
containing w and being such that, for every v E O, h(w) - k(~,~) and the vector of ~~'alrasian
equilibria ((p(w, 1), x(w, 1)), .. .,(p(w, k(w)); x(c~, k(4;)))) depends in a continuous way on
w. Define the set W' by
Vb'' -{(..,;, n) E S2' x II~ t1k E Ik~W~, 3i', i~ E I,t~,
át,, r'' ~u''(x'' (w, ~)),u'~ (x~~ (w~ k))~ a~NU~~ (x'~ (~, k)) (14)
~ati.,rs' (ui~(x~'(w,~)),u~~(x`'(~,~)))arNU~'(x''(~,~))}.
19In Theorem 4.2 it is shown that W1 is open in S2 x II and in Theorem 4.3 that YL'' is dense
inS2xII.
Theorem 4.2
Let (.k'.u`);E~ti, satisfy the .~lssumptions A1-.A2 and let .L1 E I~ `{1}. Then the set W' zs
open in S2 x II.
Proof
Let some i E I,t~ be gi~~en. Let the function g' : II' x(0, 1) x(0,1) -~ Rt~ be defined by
g'(J`.i.''.L'z) - a„i~ (2~',2'2), d(í'~ -`,2'',U2) E I-I' X(0,1) X(0,1).
It ~ti-ill be sho~ti~n that g` is continuous. Let O be an open set in R~~ and let (-', il, ïZ) E
g'-'(O) be given. Let e E 1R~t be such that B'(g'(~r',u',v~),e) C O. Let the function
e:(0, 1) x(0, 1) -~ 1R~~ be defined by
e(z~', v~) -;e, d(v', v~) E(0, 1) x(0, 1).
Since aL~ n' :(0, 1) x(0, 1) --, R~} and a„z ~r' :(0, 1) x(0,1) -a -Rtt are continuous
functions. there exists b E R}f such that (v',u~) E B~((v', i,~)T,b) implies
II(acv~.v~,T7fti(L1,
L~2) - a~vi L,Z,T7f~(L~l.Z~2))TII2 C 2~.
For e~.er~. (-'.i~',i,~2) E L';,.f x B2((u',u2)T,ó), it holds that.
i~,-~-'(i~'. i~~) - ati., ~`(i~'. v~)I
~ IaiaJf`(L''.P~) - dt.17f'(L'~.li~)I ~ ~au.iT'(Z,I U~) - ay~ti~`(L''.U~)I
C i ~ ~ ~ ` - -,
2 .
~
so g'(-`.i~'.i~Z) E B'(g'('',i~l,v2).~) C O. Hence. g'- ( D) is open, concluding the proof
that g` is a continuous function.
Let some ;.~ E S2' be gi~.en. Let O be a set open in S2', containing ~, and being such that
k(w )- k(w ). `dw E O, ~~-hile. for e~-er~~ k E Ik~;,~, the function f k~' : O-~ R'ti . defined b~-
fk.~(~;) -~'(.a, k). dw E O,
is continuous. Let the function h: O x II -~ Rk~~i't~ be defined by associating with ever~~
(„~. r) E O x II the element
h(~--) - (g' (r',~'(f~.~(w~)).u'(f~.~(,~))~a~.tiu'(f~.~(w)),...,
g~ (~~,uM(Jk(:~).M(~))
~a1( fk(w),Rf(~`''))~ ar~,u.Lf(fk(m).M(~))~T
20i:sing the continuity of the functions fk`, `dk E Ikl~,l, b'i E I,11, and g'; t1i E L~, and the
fact that u` is continuously differentiable, it follows easily that h is a continuous function.
Let the open set T~ be defined by
T,y - {t E Rk~"l;~ dk E Ik~WI, ~21, 2~ E l~til~ tk ~ tk }.
Clearly, the set W~„ defined by WW - h-1(T~), is open in O x II and therefore open in
f? x II. So. Yb'' - U;,En~ W;, is open in ~2 x II. Q.E.D.
Theorem 4.3
Let (.~',u'),E~„ satisfy the Asszlmptions AI-A2 and let ,ll E N~{1}. Then the set W' is
dense in ~2 x II.
Proof
It ~eill be sho~ti~n that the closure of W' in SZ x II contains ft' x II, a set being dense in
S2 x II. thereby showing the result. Let an element w E H1 and a set (~ being open in II
be given. Let n E II`, fli E I,~y, and e` E Co((0,1) x(0.1),Rtt), f1i E I,t~, be such that
j-j;E~~f ~;, f, C C~. It will be shown that W1 f1 ({w} x j-j;EIM V~ ,E,) ~ 0, thereby showing
that the closure of W1 in ft x II contains S2' x II.
For ever}~ k E Ikt~,~, for every i E I,tir, let the rea] numbers vk'` and dk ` be defined by
i'k~' - u`(~`(„, k)) and dk~' - ór,vu`(~'(,:~, k)). Let the set Ií1 be defined by
lí 1 - {k E Ik~y~ Óvi 7~1(Uk,l, Z,k.l)~k~l - avi ~(vk,i, ~,k,i)dk'', dt E~,N }.
If Ií' -~. then the proof is finished. Consider the case where Ií1~ 0. Let Ií2 be
a maximal subset of K' such that k', k2 E Ií2 and k' ~ k2 implies i'k''1 ~ i'k~.l 50,
{ i~k' ~ k E lí' }-{ uk~l ~ k E lí2}. Let the, possibly empty, set lí3 be defined by
]í3-{kE1k~;~~~Ií1 a,,.i nl (Z,k,l, ti,ka )ák.l ~ at,i i~
2(Zk.2, Z,k,2 )~k.2 }
For e~-ery v E (0.1), for e~.ery b E RYt satisfying B2((i~,i~)T.b) C (0.1) x(0,1), for every
~ E 1Rt~. let the function f,;,ó,e E Cx((0,1) x (0, 1),Rt) have the following properties:
1. f,..~..(i'~.i'~) - 0, t1(ul,v~) E((0. 1) x( 0, 1)) ~ B~((2',v)~~ó)~
~. ~~a(ti.,,~,~~Tfo.E.e(i''.i'~~)~~~ C s,~l(i'l,i,s) E(0,1) x(0,1),
3. dv~fv.a.-(v- zó,u- zb) ) 0.
It is not difficult to show that such a function f;,,ó,e exists, see for instance Hirsch (1976),
page 11-12. Let the function ~r E II be defined by
~1(Z'1~v2) - T1lUltv2) ~ ~ Jvk.6k.ek(vliv2)i d
kEh'~
E (0,1) x (0,1),
21and -r` - r, t~i E I;~r `{ 1}, where, for every k E lí2,
~k - min ~{ Z Ivk.l - Zk .l l k~ E Ik~W) and Uk .1 ~ Uk,l~ U 1
2Uk~1' 2(1 - Z'k.l
)J ~'
Uk - z,k,l }` ~ bk
l
,
~k - min ({Óv~7r1(Ul,v2) 1v1~22) E B2((Ukivk)Tibk)J
U{-ávz7~ 1(L'1, L`2) (U1, U2) E B2((vk~ Z'k)T~ ók) }
U{E1(U1.2'2) (vl, Z2) E B2(lti'k~ vk)T ~ bk) }
~J C IÓt,i 4~1 (Z,k,l vk.l
)dk'1 - Óvt
7f2(;Uk.2 ;vk.2)~k.21 k E Jí3 J~~
For ever}- k E Ií 2, tlhe chol ice of bk guarantees that ~r is a perturbation of r on non-
intersecting neighbourhoods of utilities consumer 1 derives at ~~'alrasian equilibria of the
economy ~-((X', u',w );Ei,,,). For every k E Ií2, the choice of vk guarantees that the
~~oting behaviour of consumer 1 is indeed perturbed at the utility he derives at Walrasian
equilibrium k. Finally, ek, dk E Ií2, is chosen such that ~r E r[;EiM V;,.,E, and the perturba-
tion is so small that, for every k E lí3, the already existing inequality of á„t ál (vk'1, vk'1)dk,'
and á„~ i~2(vk~l. i'k'' )dk'2 remains. The fact that dk'' 1 0, `dk E Ik~~,~, tli E 1,~~, guarantees
that
Cwt1f1(Uk,l ~k.l)~k.l ~ wi7r2(vk.2 ;~k,2)~k~2
dk E 111.
Clearl~'.
aL.i;~l(L,k.1,Lk.1)~k.l ~C~z.i7f2(t~k,2.Zk,2)ák.2 dk E 1í3.
Let k' E Ik~~~ `(Iíl U Ií3) be gi~.en. Then at.,-1(i,k'.l.vk'.1)dk'.1 -~3t1T2(~,k'.2 i,k'.2)dk',2,
~~.hile there exists i' E I,tir such that áL,~-'(i~k~~', vk~~l)dk~'' ~ r~ ~r~(vk~'`~ uk~''~)ák~''~. If i;k~~' E
{i~k~l ~ k E Ií ~}, then, since dk~'1 1 0,
Óv~7~1(L'k'.1
L,k'.1)~k'.I 1 av ~.2(Uk',2 Zk'.2)~k'.2
7- '
If i~k~' ~{ck' ~ k E Ií 2}, then the choice of ók, dk E lí2, guarantees that
~L ~1(Z.k'.1 t.k'.1)~k'.I - ~ii7r1(L'k~.l,t,k~,l)~k',l
So, it follo~~~s that (w, n) E 1'V1, whereas, clearly, (~.', ~r) E{w} x j[,E~~~ Vr ,e,. Q.E.D.
Theorem 4.4
Let (.fi~`.u');E~y satisfy the .4ssumptions A1-A2 and let ,b1 E N~{1}. Then there exists
an open and dense set W2 in f2 x II such that, for every (w, ~r) E W2, for every W'al-
rasian equilióriurn (p',x') u'ith p;~. - 1 of the economy E-((X',u',w');Er~,,) it holds that
-~sEltif ~t.iTt(21~(,~.:)~ ut(~.t))vr,a'ut(~.t)(~T~t - w'~) ~ 0 for some j E I,v-1.
22Proof
B~ Theorem ~I.2 and Theorem 4.3 the set W' is open and dense in ft x II. Let ~r E II be
such that the set f2;., defined by
S2r-{wES2 (~,,, ir) E W' } ,
is non-empty. Since W1 is open in f2 x II, it holds that S?- is open in ~2. Let w E 52;,
and (p',s) E R~t x.k w.ith p;~. - 1 be given. If (p',i) is a~~alrasian equilibrium of the
econom}' E' - ((.~',u`.,~ );Et,y) satisfying -~;Et~,r w~~ (u'(~ ), ~'(~ ))~ixu`(~`)(~7 -`~) -
0, dj E ~,~--i, then there exists á' E R, b'i E I,ti~, such that
ór,u'(i )T -~`(Pl,...,p~~. „1)T - 6.v, d2 E In1, (lo)
~ ~ 1~ ~ ~ 1)u,,~ - 0 Hi E 1~~~, (16) (Pi,..., P.v-i , ) - (Pi,..., P,v-i ~ ,
LiEI,yTj - LiElMw
- O, dJ E 1:1'-1, (1i)
-~iELiy~ri~
~1Li(2 ) ,~~(~ )~ ~rNU~(~ )(~1
-W1) - ~. (lÓ)
~otice that the condition that on the market of the numeraire commodity the total excess
demand is equal to zero is not specified. This condition is implied by the equations in (16)
and (1 ï). Let the function
~~ : X x R'~ x Rt~' x f2;. --~ R.'r:y}:~}n'
be defined such that t~(~,~,(pt....,p~--1)T,w) is the left-hand side of (15)-(lá), for ever~-
(~,~,(p~,,,.,p~,,-~)T.w) E.~ x R'~ x 1R~t1 x S2n. For every,.; E S?. the function
t~~ :.l x R~r x Rt~ i~ R.~r ~~} ~i},y
is defined b~~ associating w-ith ever~- (.~, ~. (pl...., p~--t )T ) E.~ x IR'tir x 1R~t' the element
z'(z,~-(Pi-.-~.P.~'-i)~~w). The matrix of partial deri~~ati~~es of ~~ evaluated at a point ~-
(1..;~, (pi,..., p~.-~)T,w) E X x R`~~ x R~~' x S2~ such that t~(~) - 0~r~~}~~1t~~ is denoted by-
.lI and is gi~-en in Table -1.1. It will be sho~~.n that the matrix .lI has rank .ll-~' ~- ~1 ~.~~.
`otice that
~~,~ t~ai.~.}.tirt.v(~) - d~,~~ ~u'(á ), u'(.~ )) ar,~.u`(s ),b'i E I.tr, (19)
,
~y~í~sf~'}.tif}~'(~) - 6, ~íi E Iit,~1j E I~ ~{1}. (20)
,
The partial deri~~atives of tiï,yN}M}N at ~ with respect to ~ are quite complicated, but do
not matter in the following.
Let y E Rv~}tif},v be such that yT hl - 6zu,y},~},v-~T. Then, yTa;~N~(~) - 0, `di E I.tif,
implies, using (20), that
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B~' the definition of S2- there exists i', i? E I,til such that
ai.,~' (ili'(~'),u''(~'))~r.,-tl`'(~') ~~t~~~~ ( u'?(~?),u'~(~?))~r.Vu`~(~~~)" (~'~~
~Ioreo~~er, ( 19), (21), and y~ó~,.~i~(~) - 0, `di E{ii,i?}, implies
-y11.Vttiftl f (~.~.i-`~ ~tli~ ~~~ ) iu~~ ~~~ )~ ~r.vu~~ ~~ ~ ~y.ll Vt.1.1t.~' - ~. ~~3)
-.y.11 ~'t11t1 ~ C7~,i T`~ ~lli~ ~~? ). llti? ~~? )~ C~i ~. u~? ~~ ~ )y.lT~'t.11t.V - ~. ~ Z~ )
(~~t,r' (~!~'~~~').u~'~.~~'))ar~.u~'~.~
~12 ~~ -i~ i~ ~t~ ~~ --2~ -~L.~ T (u (.~ ), u (:t' )) ór,.. u (~ ) y:N.,~t:~ItN - o,
imply-ing by. (22) that y,tir,yt,tift,v - 0. Now it can be shown similarly as in the proof
of Theorem :3.6 that y - 0'tf'`~~t'Nt'N, so .1~1 has rank 1LI,~' ~:L1 -}- 1~', and y intersects
{p'til'~~t ~!t~} trans~'ersally., W rTi {0'~~t'tift'v }. Let the set i2n be defined by
52;. - {w E 52;, ~G~`~ rTi {O~.vt.tft:v} ~
,
24From the transversality theorem it follows that the set S2r `S2n has Lebesgue measure zero.
For every w E S2,-, zr~~ is a function from an (9~LN ~ M f a' - 1)-dimensional C~ manifold
into an (-11.V f:1~1 f N)-dimensional C~ manifold, {0'~~~tMt'ti~} is a 0-dimensional C~
manifold. ~,~~ E C1(X x IR'u x 1Rt}',1R'~'~}'L~}'~~) and zr~~ r~i {0`~`~'t'Lrt'n~}, so it follows
that v~~-~ ({0'~~'~~t'~t'ti~ }) -~. Let the set W be defined by
W-{(w,~)EW' w E 5~,. } .
Clearly. the closure of W in W' is equal to W'. Since W' is dense in 52 x II it holds that
W is dense in S2 x II. Let the set W2 be defined by the elements (w, ~r) E S21 x II such that
every ~~'alrasian equilibrium (p',~') with p;ti. - 1 of the economy E- ((X',u',w')iEln,)
satisfies -~,E1,~ Óvl iT'(IL'(.T"), ZL'(Z'"))Ór.,.ul(S")(.~~' -`~~) ~ 0 for some j E I,~,--1. Clearly,
1'V C Wz and hence WZ is dense in S2 x II. Similar to the case where it is shown that W'
is open in S2 x TI, it can be shown that YV2 is open in S2 x II. Q.E.D.
Combining the results of Theorem 3.7 and Theorem 4.4, the following result is obtained.
Theorem 4.5
Let (X')iEl.~, satisfy the .4ssvmption A1 and let ~ti1 E I~~~ {1 }. Then there exists an open and
dense set V in L' x S2 x II such that, for every (u,w,~r) E V, e2ery 6~'alrasian equilibrium
(p',x') u;íth p;~, - 1 of the econotrty E-((X',u',w');E1.tir) is locally unique, regular, for
ei~ery j E 1.~.-i, ~li(x') -~li(x') - 1, and
w, r..; , ~ . ~ - . T




Let rhe set V' be defined b}~ V1 - lf3 x II, where Lf3 is as in Theorem 3.7. The set Yh'2
obtained in Theorem 4.4 depends on the choice of u E L' and will therefore be denoted b~.
V1~'u. Hu E C-. Let the set V2 be defined b}-
V'~-{(u.w,;~)EL; xS?xII (w.-)EWu}.
Let the set V be defined as the set of elements (u,w,-) E V' such that, for every ~~-alrasian
equilibrium (p'..r') with p;.,. - 1 of E' -((.X',u',w')iEl1,),
- ~ Vul1r' ~ZL'(~"),2L'(2")JVrNLII(.x")(2~' -w'~) ~ ~
iEl,y ` i
for some j E I~--~. `otice that V' f1Vz C V. Since V C V' it holds that, for every (u,w, r, ) E
V, every ~~-alrasian equilibrium (p',x') with p;~. - 1 of the economy E' - ((X',u',w')iEi.,,)
is locally unique, regular, and, for every j E Ih.-~, ~1~(~') -~1~(~') - 1. It remains to
be shown that V is open and dense in U x f2 x II. Since U3 is open and dense in L~' x S2, it
'~ ~holds that V' - U3 x II is open and dense in U x 1Z x II. Clearly, V2 is dense in U x~2 x II.
Since the intersection of an open and dense set with a dense set is dense, it holds t.hat
V'f1V2isdenseinL' xS2xII,soVisdenseinUxf2xII.
The ~~'alrasian equilibrium set moves continuously in (u, w), for every ( u, w) E U3, see
Theorem 3.7. Since the voting functions have no influence on the Walrasian equilibrium
set it clearly holds that the Walrasian equilibrium set moves continuously in (u,w,r),
for every (u,;.;, ~r) E V'. In the proof of Theorem 4.2 it has been shown that, for every
i E I,ti~, the function g` : II` x(0,1) x(0, 1) --~ lRtt, defined by g`(~ , v', v2) - á„~ r(vl, i~z),
b'(r, i~', u2) E II' x (0, 1) x (0, 1), is continuous. Similarly, it can be shown that, for every
i E 1a~, the function f' : L" x 1R~t -~ 1R, defined by f'(u ,.i) - áLti.u(i), b'(u , x) E
C-` x 1R~t, is continuous. Therefore, it follows easily that V is open in V1. Hence, V is open
inUxS2xII. Q.E.D.
Let the political economic system ~- ((X',u`,w'),E~M,(l,L),(Ak,(~r`k),E~M)kE12) satisfy
the Assumptions A1-A5 and A7, let M E 1V`{1}, and let ( u,w, ~) E V with V as in Theorem
4.5. Suppose political candidate 2 proposes the Walrasian equilibrium ( p', p', q') E Az.
lising ( 12) and Theorem 4.5, it is clear that it is not optimal for political candidate 1
to choose the action (p', p', q') E AI. Such a proposal can be improved by proposing
(p' p' q(p')) E ,A1, ~~~here pl can be chosen arbitrarily close to p". Since the ~~~'alrasian
equilibria of the economy E' - ((X',u',w');EI„) are locally unique, p' can be chosen such
that it is not a ~~~alrasian equilibrium price s}'stem. By symmetr}', there exists an open
and dense set V in L' x S2 x TI, for which the statements made above are true with the roles
of the political candidates 1 and '2 reversed. ~Ioreover, the set V fl V is open and dense in
C'xRxII.
Let the political economic system ~ - ((.~ `, u`, c.:`),E~.ar, (1, L), (Ak, (7r'k),E~.y )kE12 ) ~~'ith
status quo a~~'alrasian equilibrium ( p', .r') ~ti'ith p;~. - 1 of the economy ï-(( X `. u`, w' ),Et,,,, )
satisf}- the :~ssumptions A1-.~-1, Aï, and A9, let .ll E I` `{1}, and let (u,,.,;,~) E V with V
as in Theorem ~1.5. It follo~~~s from Theorem ~.1 and Theorem 4..5 that political candidate
1 proposes lí'~~~1~'~~z ~ 0~-' ín a directional political economic equilibrium of the polit-
ical economic system ~~ti.ith status quo (p',.r'). B}~ symmetry, there exists an open and
dense set V in L' x S2 x II, for ~ahich the statements made above are true ~ti-ith the roles
of the political candidates 1 and 2 reversed. Jloreover, the set V fl V is open and dense in
Uxf2xII.
Corollary 4.6 and Corollary -1.7 are immediately obtained from Theorem 4.5 and the
remarks being made in the previous t~ti.o paragraphs.
Corollary 4.6
Let (X'),E~M, (1, L), (Ak)kEi, satisfy the Assumptians A1 and A4-A5, and let M E N~{1}.
Then there esists an open and dense set of utility functions, initial endowments, and voting
26functions (u,w,~r) E U x S2 x II such that there is no political economic equilibrium of
the political economic system l; -((X',2L',w');Ef,y, (l,L), (Ak (7r`k);Et,y)kEl2) where both
political candidates choose an action (p', p',q') E .A1 - Az corresponding to a 4t'alrasian
equilibrium of the economy iï -((X',u',,.~');EtM).
Corollary 4.7
Let (X'),EtM, (l, L), (Ak)ke[, satisfy the Assumptions A1, A4, and A9, and let NI E~~
{1}. Then there exists an open and dense set of utility functions, initial endowments,
and i~oting functions (u,w,n) E C' x f2 x II such that in euery directional political eco-
nomic eguilibrium (p~, p~`z) of the political economic system ~-((X', u',,,~;');Et,,,, (l, L),
(Ak,(T'k);El.tif)kEt2) wtth statuS qiLO a WalraSlan eqiL2126rttlm (p',~') w1tÍt pnr - 1 Of the
economy ~-(( X', ul,w`);EtM), both p.i ~():v-~ and p.z ~ p,v-i.
Therefore, it can be concluded that, generically, both in a political economic equilibrium
and a directional political economic equilibrium, ~~'alrasian equilibria are unstable and
rationally behaving political candidates have incentives to impose price regulations on the
economic system.
5 An Example
In this section the same example as used in Herings (1q94) will be analyzed. Consider the
political economic system ~ -((X',u',w');EI„(l,L).(,Ák (~r'k);Et2)kEt,) ~~'ith status quo
the ~Valrasian equilibrium (p',:r') w'ith p2 - 1 of the economy lï -((X', u'.w~');Et,), w'here
-~- - 2, X1 - Xz - ~tt, ul (~i,~z) - (~i)' (~z)5 . d.rl E Xt, uz(~i,~z) - ( ~i)' (~`s); .
tJ~z E.Yz, respectively, w1 - wz -(1,4)T. (l.L) represents the uniform rationing system,
w'here 1: Qz -~ -IR~ is defined bY li(q) - li(q) - -`?9i, dq E Qz. 1'z(q) - IZ(q) --8qz.
t1q E Qz. and L : Qz -~ 1Rt is defined by Li(q) - Li(q) -~~4i. dq E Q2, L's(q) - Lz(q) -
BQz. `dq E Qz,
Á' - Áz - {-1,0.1}.
and, for every i E Iz, for ever~~ k E Izi n`k : 1Rtt x 1R~} -~ [0, 1] is defined by
exP(z'`k) ;i ;z -'k(U'i i.iz) - t1i~ z~ E IRt} x IIlt~. eXp(U,11 ~ exp(v~2),
The unique ~~'alrasian equilibrium (p'J, ~') with p2 - 1 of the economy E' is given by pi - 4,
~'i - (1~.15)T, and ~'z - (5.65)T, see Herings (1994).
:~otice that the Assumptions A1-,a4, ~6, and A8 are satisfied, except that the range of
the utility funetions is 1Rtt instead of (0,1) and hence the domain of the voting functions
is given by 1Rtt x 1R~~ instead of (0, 1) x(0, 1). Obviously, it is possible to take a monotone
?7transformation of t.he utility function such that its range becomes (0, 1). Notice that also the
voting functions have to be transformed in that case. So, a directional political economic
equilibrium of the political economic system ~ with status quo (p',r') is guaranteed to
exist bv Theorem 3.9.
A political candidate k E Is has three possibilities in this example. Either decrease the
price of commodity 1, i.e., pi --1, or stay at the status quo, i.e., p~ - 0, or increase the
price of commodity 1, i.e., p'i - 1. After some calculations it follows that all possible price
regulations (p, p) E P and elements q E Qo(p, p) are given by elements of the set S defined
bv
ti-{(P,P,4) E A x Q'
Therefore, it follows that
and
pGp1Glandq-l, orlGp1G4andq-2} 15~, or
pi - 4 and ,ó G q C ó, or (25)






is G p~ G 4,
4 C p~ C 16,
z'2ÍPi ) -( a tPl ) 5 ( isSaP, )
5, 1 L Pl G 4,
Z~21P1) - (- 16p6q )S(3s-Pl )5
~i G pi G 11.
It is easily ~-erified that óp,i~l(-1) -- 5 and óP,i~2(~) - 2545 -~ 0.2~6. `otice that this
corresponds to the result of Theorem 3.2, since
-aSZul(~-1)(~;~ -w;) - -5(;~)5(,) - -2.
?
-a~~u~(.~-~)(~;~ -w~) - -s(~)s(-5) - s~s.
5
It follows that an increase in the price of commodity 1 is harmful to consumer 1, while
consumer 2 benefits from such an increase, even when taking into account the resulting
supply rationing on the market of commodity 1. This is not surprising since consumer 1
demands commodity 1, while consumer 2 supplies commodity 1. lotice that the benefits
for consumer 2 exceed the detrimental effects for consumer 1.
In order to determine the influence of the utility level on the voting behaviour of
consumers, r7v.,~ri1(i.'(pi),i ( pi)) and ó„~~r'I(v`(pi),v (p~)) have to be computed for ecery
consurner i E I2. It follows easily that
ó,,,r`~ (z'`(Pi),z~(Pi)) -
a~,~~`i (z`(Pi),z''(Pi)) -
exP(v'(P~))eXP(i''(Pj)) - 4 dl E 12.
(exP(v'(Pj))texP(v`(Pi)))
-eXP(v`(Pi))exP(t''(Pi)) 1 d2 E IZ.
(exP(v'(PÍ))texP(u'(PÍ)))~ - -4'
2b~Ioreo~-er,
;z ( ~ ~ ~)1 - `' ( '(Pi), '(Pi)~ , ó,,, ;~ lu (Pi), ï' (Pi 1 -á„~ ~r i~ v
Vt.z7f~2 (V~(P1)~v~1P1)) - -VL.Z7f~1 (Ut(Pl)~L~t(P1)) .
Therefore,
lí ~(Pi~P'i) - so(4s - 1)(~i -Pi)~ dPi E {-1,0, 1}, tlpi E{-1,0.1},
lí~(Pi~Pi) - so(45 - 1)(~i -Pi). dPi E{-1,0, 1}, b'~i E{-1,0, 1}.
The pa~.-offs of the political candidates of the game G- (Al, A2, Ií', lí2) are giren in
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Figure 3.1. Pa~~-offs x 1000 of the political candidates in the example.
to increase the price of commodit~~ 1 in a directional political economic equilibrium of the
political economic sy.stem E w.ith status quo (p'..z'). since (1. 1) is a`ash equilibrium in
pure strategies of the game G, so the ~~'alrasian equilibrium (p', x') is unstable as a status
quo.
Finally, consider the case ~ehere the political candidates ha~.e different sets of admissible
actions, for example because of commitments made in the past. One political candidate
is assumed to have the possibility- of low.ering the price of commodity~ 1 compared to the
~~'alrasian equilibrium price, w.hile the other political candidate might propose to increase
the price of this commodity.. Both political candidates have the possibility to stay. at the
status quo. Hence,
,A1 - {-1,0} and AZ - {0,1}.
The pay-offs of the political candidates of the resulting game G- (A',.A2, Ií', Ií2) are
gi~~en in Figure ~.2. From Figure ~.2 it follows immediately that the directional political
economic equilibrium of the political economic system E~rith status quo (p', ~') is gi~.en by
?gPolitical candidate 2
0 1




Figure 5.2. Pay-offs x 1000 of the political candidates in the example.
(0, 1), so political candidate 1 proposes to stay at the status quo, while political candidate
2 proposes to increase the price of commodity 1. Notice that the expected plurality of
political candidate 2 is positive in this equilibrium.
References
Coughlin. P.J., and S. `itzan (1981), "Directional and Local Electoral Equilibria with
Probabilistic ~'oting", Journal of Economic Theory, 24, 226-239.
Debreu, G. (1970), "Economies with a Finite Set of Equilibria'. Econometrica, 38, 38ï-
392.
Herings, P.J.J. (1994), Endogenously Deterrnined Price Rigidities, CentER Discussion Pa-
per 9-1'30. Tilburg L~ni~.ersit~-, Tilburg.
Ilirsch, ~1.~t'. (19ï6), Differential Topology. Springer-~'erlag, Berlin.
Laroque, G. (19ï8), `'The Fixed Price Equilibria: Some Results in Local Comparati~e
Statics'~, Econometrica, 46. 112ï-115J.
~1as-Colell, .~. (1985), The Theory of General Economic Equilibrium, A Di,f~erentiable r1 p-
proach. Cambridge L'ni~~ersit~- Press, Cambridge.
Smale, S. (19i4), "Global Analysis and Economics IIA; Extension of a Theorem of De-
breu'', Journalof .1fathematical Economics, 1, 1-14.
~l'iesmeth. H. (19ï9), "Regular Competitive Equilibria in Disequilibrium Economics",
Journol of -llathematical Economics, 6, 23-29.
30IN 1994 REEDS VERSCHENEN
632 B.B. van der Genugten
Identification, estimating and testing in the restricted linear model
Communicated by Dr. A.H.O. van Soest
633 George W.J. Hendrikse
Screening, Competition and (DelCentralization
Communicated by Prof.dr. S.W. Douma
634 A.J.T.M. Weeren, J.M. Schumacher, and J.C. Engwerda
Asymptotic Analysis of Nash Equilibria in Nonzero-sum Linear-Quadratic Differen-
tial Games. The Two-Player case
Communicated by Prof.dr. S.H. Tijs
635 M.J. Coster
C!uadratic forms in Design Theory
Communicated by Dr.ir. W.H. Haemers
636 Drs. Erwin van der Krabben, Prof.dr. Jan G. Lambooy
An institutional economic approach to land and property markets - urban dynamics
and institutional change
Communicated by Dr. F.W.M. Boekema
637 Bas van Aarle
Currency substitution and currency controls: the Polish experience of 1990
Communicated by Prof.dr. H. Huizinga
638 J. Bell
Joint Ventures en Ondernemerschap: Interpreneurship
Communicated by Prof.dr. S.W. Douma
639 Frans de Roon and Chris Veld
Put-call parities and the value of early exercise for put options on a performance
index
Communicated by Prof.dr. Th.E. Nijman
640 Willem J.H. Van Groenendaal
Assessing demand when introducing a new fuel: natural gas on Java
Communicated by Prof.dr. J.P.C. Kleijnen
641 Henk van Gemert 8~ Noud Gruijters
Patterns of Financial Change in the OECD area
Communicated by Prof.dr. J.J Sijben
642 Drs. M.R.R. van Bremen, Drs. T.A. Marra en Drs. A.H.F. Verboven
Aardappelen, varkens en de termijnhandel: de reële optietheorie toegepast
Communicated by Prof.dr. P.W. Moerlandii
643 W.J.H. Van Groenendaal en F. De Gram
The generalization of netback value calculations for the determination of industrial
demand for natural gas
Communicated by Prof.dr. J.P.C. Kleijnen
644 Karen Aardal, Yves Pochet and Laurence A. Wolsey
Capacitated Facility Location: Valid Inequalities and Facets
Communicated by Dr.ir. W.H. Haemers
645 Jan J.G. Lemmen
An Introduction to the Diamond-Dybvig Model 11983)
Communicated by Dr. S. Eijffinger
646 Hans J. Gremmen and Eva van Deurzen-Mankova
Reconsidering the Future of Eastern Europe: The Case of Czecho-Slovakia
Communicated by Prof.dr. H.P. Huizinga
647 H.M. Webers
Non-uniformities in spatial location models
Communicated by Prof.dr. A.J.J. Talman
648 Bas van Aarle
Social welfare effects of a common currency
Communicated by Prof.dr. H. Huizinga
649 Laurence A.G.M. van Lent
De winst is absoluut belangrijk!
Communicated by Prof.drs. G.G.M. Bak
650 Bert Hamminga
Jager over de theorie van de internationale handel
Communicated by Prof.dr. H. Huizinga
651 J.Ch. Caanen and E.N. Kertzman
A comparison of two methods of inflation adjustment
Communicated by Prof.dr. J.A.G. van der Geld
652 René van den Brink
A Note on the r-Value and r-Related Solution Concepts
Communicated by Prof.dr. P.H.M. Ruys
653 J. Engwerda and G. van Willigenburg
Optimal sampling-rates of digital LQ and LQG tracking controllers with costs
associated to sampling
Communicated by Prof.dr. J.M. Schumacher
654 J.C. de Vos
A Thousand Golden Ten Orbits
Communicated by Prof.dr. B.B. van der Genugteniii
655 Gert-Jan Otten, Peter Borm, Stef Tijs
A Note on the Characterizations of the Compromise Value
Communicated by Prof.dr. A.J.J. Talman
656 René Peeters
On the p-ranks of the adjacency matrices of distance-regular graphs
Communicated by Dr.ir. W.H. Haemers
657 J. Kriens, L.W.G. Strijbosch, J. Ví]riïs
Differentiability Properties of the Efficient (~, a')-Set in the Markowitz Portfolio
Selection Method
Communicated by Prof.dr. A.J.J. Talman
658 Prof.dr. E.J. Bijnen and dr. M.F.C.M. Wijn
Corporate Prediction Models, Ratios or Regression Analysis?
Communicated by Prof.dr. W. van Hulst
659 Edwin R. van Dam
Regular graphs with four eigenvalues
Communicated by Dr.ir. W.H. Haemers
660 G.J. van der Pijl
Quality of information and the goals and targets of the organization:
a model and a method
Communicated by Prof.dr. P.M.A. Ribbers
661 Jan van der Leeuw
The second derivative of the likelihood of an exact ARMA model
Communicated by Dr. H.H. Tigelaar
662 Jan van der Leeuw, Harry Tigelaar
An asymptotic justification for a modified GLS procedure to estimate ARMA
parameters
Communicated by Prof.dr. B.B. van der Genugten
663 H.M. Webers
The location model with two periods of price competition
Communicated by Prof.dr. A.J.J. Talman
664 L.A.G.M. van Lent
Management accounting en stroomsgewijze produktie
Communicated by Dr. M.F.C.M. Wijn
665 Noud Gruijters
Financiële integratie, de prijsbenadering en rente-arbitrage
Communicated by Prof.dr. J.J. Sijben
666 Henk van Gemert
Monetaire conflicten en de integratiegeschiedenis van België en Nederland
Communicated by Prof.dr. J.J. SijbenIV
667 Rik G.M. Pieters and Tammo H.A. Bijmolt
The effect of duration, serial-position and competitive clutter on consumer
memory for television advertising: an extension and a test of generalizability
Communicated by Prof.dr. Th.M.M. Verhallen
668 Dr. M.F.C.M. Wijn, Drs. W.A. Hofenk, Drs. R.W. Hoekstra en M.B. Hengeveld
Kritische succesfactoren aan een nadere analyse onderworpen
Communicated by Prof.dr. R. Bannink
669 Drs. N.B. Brentjens en Drs. J. Bell
Samenwerking in de detailhandel: Theorie en praktijk
Communicated by Prof.dr. S.W. Douma
670 Masakiyo Miyazawa 81 Gert Nieuwenhuis
Modified Palm and modified time-stationary distributions for random measures and
applications
Communicated by Prof.dr.ir. O. Boxma
671 Noud Gruijters
Kapitaalrestricties, renteverschillen en valutaspeculatie
Communicated by Prof.dr. J.J. Sijben
672 Jacob C. Engwerda en Arie J.T.M. Weeren
On the relationship between the open-loop Nash equilibrium in LQ-games
and the inertia of a matrix
Communicated by Prof.dr. J. Schumacher
673 Tom Berglund
The Pricing of Initial Public Offerings: A Simple Model
Communicated by Prof.dr. P.W. Moerland
674 Erik Canton
The OECD 1951-88 Growth Experience Revisited
Communicated by Prof.dr. A.B.T.M. van Schaik
675 Willem H. Haemers
Interlacing Eigenvalues and Graphs
Communicated by Prof.dr. M.H.C. Paardekooper
676 R.J. Casimir
Infogame Users Manual
Communicated by Prof.dr.ir. C.A.Th. Takkenberg
677 A.L. Hempenius
Fixed transaction costs and modelling limited dependent variables
Communicated by Prof.dr.ir. A. Kapteyn
678 Eline van der Heijden
On the notion of altruism
Communicated by Prof.dr. H.A.A. Verbonv
679 Dr. Pieter J.F.G. Meulendijks en Prof.dr. Dick B.J. Schouten
Recessie en herstel in Europa
Communicated by Prof.dr. A.H.J.J. Kolnaar
680 Robert van Heumen, Bezalel Peleg, Stef Tijs, Peter Borm
Characterizations of Solutions for Bayesian Games
Communicated by Prof.dr. A.J.J. Talman
681 G.J. van der Pijl, J.G. Verrijdt, G.J.P. Swinkels
Standardization and certification of information systems development
Communicated by Prof.dr. P.Th.M. Laagland
682 Drs. B. Kamp
A neural network model to forecast and describe bond ratings
Communicated by Prof.drs. G.G.M. Bak RA
683 Drs. Frans Verhulst
IMF en schuldenproblematiek: Het IMF beleid in de periode 1982-1988
Communicated by Prof.dr. J.J. SijbenV1
IN 1995 REEDS VERSCHENEN
684 Paul Smit
The Approximation of an Eigenvector by Ritzvectors
Communicated by Prof.dr. M.H.C. Paardekooper
685 Harry Webers
The generalized circular model
Communicated by Prof.dr. A.J.J. Talman
686 Laurence A.G.M. van Lent
Pressure and Politics in Financial Accounting Regulation
Communicated by Prof.drs. G.G.M. Bak RA
687 B. de Rooij en G.J. van der Pijl
A contingency approach to Quality System Implementation
Communicated by Prof.dr.ir. C.A.Th. Takkenberg
688 Edwin R. van Dam en Willem H. Haemers
Graphs with constant p and N
Communicated by Prof.dr. S.H. Tijs
689 G. Facchini, F. van Megen, P. Borm and S. Tijs
Congestion models and weighted Bayesian potential games
Communicated by Prof.dr. A.J.J. Talman
690 Jos Grazell en Chris Veld
Alternatieve Perspectieven in de Theorie van de Ondernemingsfinanciering
Communicated by Prof.dr. P.W. Moerland
691 Gert Hegge en Rezaul Kabir
Een nadere analyse van de relaties tussen aandelenrendementen en winsten,
dividenden en cash-flows
Communicated by Prof.dr. P.W. Moerland
692 P. Jean-Jacques Herings
On the Representation of Admissible Rationing Schemes by Rationing Functions
Communicated by Prof.dr. A.J.J. TalmanKatholieke Universiteit Brabant
PO Box 90153
5000 LE Tilburg
The Netherlands
ai~ai~~~~~~~~d~inu